That this form of argumentation is conducted by one person does not alter the fact that it is a dual-role activity, although in this case both roles are occupied by a single person.
Similarly, individual inquiry does involve disagreement, although the disagreement in such cases arises from an incompatible view rather than from another individual. Blair further argues that the lack of public performance of the speech acts involved in argumentation is irrelevant since one would expect the inquirer to be able to reconstruct the various moves in the argumentative inquiry. Thus Blair concludes that a speech act analysis is applicable to all these cases of argumentation, and that, from this perspective, all can be seen as instances of co-operative dispute-resolving argumentation.
I find this reasoning compelling with respect to viewing argumentation from a discourse analysis perspective. I would argue, however, that from an epistemological perspective, the process in all these cases can be viewed as one of inquiry. The inquiry may be undertaken by one person or several, with the possibility of people sharing roles or even exchanging roles; the division of labour within the argument situation is irrelevant.
What is relevant is the epistemological structure, which is one in which knowledge claims are formulated, tested and adjusted in order to arrive at the best justified position.
It may appear initially that the case of individuals involved in a disagreement would not conform to the inquiry model since the aim of each might be to persuade the other of the correctness of his or her position rather than to inquire. Thus, even if the psychological aim of the participants might be to win, provided that they are willing to abide by the rules of co-operative argument, the epistemological structure of the enterprise necessitates inquiry.
Indeed, the rules of dialectical interchange which van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose are really rules which ensure that the disputants, whatever their predisposition at the commencement of the discussion, do in fact inquire.
These rules make explicit the inquiry dimension. Moreover, many of the points which Blair raises in the course of his discussion seem to reinforce this point regarding the primacy of inquiry. This similarity between solo inquiry and the revised model I am suggesting for multi-purpose dispute-resolving argumentation is a point in favour of that revision, for it seems clear that dispute-resolving argumentation is possible only to the extent that the disputing parties co-operate with a view to reaching agreement — that is, function the way a solo inquirer does , p.
At one point Blair is willing to view as a form of inquiry argumentative discussion in which the parties test beliefs by seeing how far they can be defended. He further states that disputes in which each side aims to win ought ideally to be preceded by argumentative inquiry and are unjustified if not so conducted , pp. Yet surely the latter are also unjustified if the participants do not abide by the rules of argumentative exchange, if they are not willing to concede to a stronger argument for example, and so ideally dispute-resolving argumentation is also a form of inquiry.
Blair also draws a comparison between inquiry and the type of argumentation undertaken to convince a third party or parties by stating that the judge or jury in the latter type of exchange does not play an adversarial role in the proceedings but rather plays the role of an inquirer , p. I have argued that, from an epistemological perspective, argumentation is best seen as inquiry.
I also believe that a conception of argumentation as inquiry is helpful from a pedagogical perspective and that there are good reasons for stressing the notion of inquiry in pedagogy related to argumentation skills. Yet as teachers of argumentation we realize what an exceedingly difficult task this turns out to be. Students display strong tendencies to avoid challenge to their own beliefs, to ignore contrary evidence, to straw-person the beliefs of others, to refuse to concede points, to start with conclusions and then look for arguments to support them, to want to win at all costs.
Numerous theorists have pointed out that the dominant metaphor for argument in our culture is that of struggle, usually violent Cohen ; Hundleby ; Rooney And Blair describes the situation thus:.
Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson argue that such language use is not incidental but actually shapes the practice:. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own.
We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. Added to PP index Total views 34 , of 2,, Recent downloads 6 months 2 , of 2,, How can I increase my downloads? Sign in to use this feature. About us. Editorial team. This article has no associated abstract. No keywords specified fix it. No categories specified categorize this paper.
Find it on Amazon. Applied ethics. History of Western Philosophy. Normative ethics. Philosophy of biology. Philosophy of language. However, when the argument and the methods used are firmly regulated then there is less likelihood of coming to a conclusion, agreed or otherwise, unless one person gives up and concedes, which effectively means nobody has persuaded anybody of anything.
The paradox is that argument should reduce uncertainty but may only serve to increase it as more information and perceptions appear and are left unresolved. A result of this is that people may be unwilling to argue as they feel their views will not be treated fairly. As a result of the uncertainty, confrontation is often perceived as a risk.
When we are open with our views there is a possibility of our being proved wrong, that other may attack or penalize us and that we could lose social status or worse. In short, the possible costs and losses from argument leads us to avoid it unless we feel confident that we will be treated fairly. This is one reason why arguments with peers are more common than with superiors. With people at the same level, you can have an argument and no matter who wins, there are few personal implications.
There is a sharing of the risk as options are openly explored. When arguing with a superior, many feel they must accept claims without challenge, lest they are punished for insubordination.
A person's frame of reference is the lens through which they perceive the world, creating meaning and assuming truth. This is a complex process where everything from beliefs to studies lead to a system of filters that shape how we see the world. It is not unsurprising that two people will have quite different frames of reference. The argument problem occurs when one person uses their personal frame of reference to describe or assess something.
The extent to which the other person agrees or not will be based largely on the extent to which their frames of reference overlap. Toulmin's argument model , Frame of Reference. Chapter 1. Chapter 2. The Contemporary Renaissance in the Study of Argument.
Chapter 3. Traditional Conceptions of Argument. Introduction: Kinds of Argument. Chapter 5. Two concepts of argument. Chapter 6. A Third Perspective on Argument.
Introduction: Scholarly Perspectives on Argument. Chapter 7. Perspectives on Argument. Chapter 8. Argument as Method: its Nature, its Limitations and its Uses. Chapter 9. Chapter Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse.
0コメント